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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Barbara Elman, a federal employee, appeals from the 
decision of the District Court granting summary judgment 
to the United States on her claim under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2671-2680. This 
appeal requires us to consider whether a federal employee 
who has received compensation under the Federal 
Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. S 8101 et 
seq., for an injury sustained during the course of 
employment may sue the United States under the FTCA, 
alleging that the United States' role in causing the injury 
was significantly different from its role as an employer. 
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I. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Elman is an 
employee at the Philadelphia office of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On 
November 20, 1996, she and a co-worker left the EEOC 
offices to attend a federal employees' health benefits fair 
being held at the Federal Building nearby. While walking 
along the south side of Market Street between 5th and 6th 
Streets, Elman fell, fracturing her left knee and injuring her 
face. Elman claims that her fall was caused by a defect in 
the sidewalk, which is owned by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania but maintained by the National Park Service. 
 
Elman required the insertion of three bone screws and 
has incurred pain and suffering. Because of her injuries, 
Elman applied for workers' compensation benefits under 
FECA on December 3, 1996. Her application was approved 
on January 8, 1997, and as of August 25, 1997, Elman had 
received $20,299 in FECA benefits. 
 
Elman also sought to receive compensation for her 
injuries from the National Park Service. On July 3, 1997, 
she filed an administrative claim with the Park Service, 
which it denied on August 18, 1997. Elman then filed suit 
against, inter alia, the United States in the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking 
compensation under the FTCA. The government moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that recovery under 
FECA disqualified Elman from recovering under the FTCA. 
The District Court granted that motion by Order dated 
February 27, 1988, and Elman filed a timely appeal. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review 
of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. We apply"the 
same test the district court should have utilized initially," 
viewing those inferences that may be drawn from the 
underlying facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 
(3d Cir. 1976). 
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II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
An employee of the federal government is entitled to be 
compensated for "personal injury sustained while in the 
performance of his duty" under 5 U.S.C. S 8102(a) and to 
receive medical treatment under 5 U.S.C. S 8103. Section 
8116 of the same title explicitly provides that the liability 
incurred under these provisions, with one exception not 
pertinent to this appeal, is exclusive. It states: 
 
       The liability of the United States or an instrumentality 
       thereof under this subchapter . . . with respect to the 
       injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead 
       of all other liability of the United States or the 
       instrumentality to the employee. . . because of the 
       injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding . . . or by 
       an administrative or judicial proceeding under .. . a 
       Federal tort liability statute. . . . 
 
5 U.S.C. S 8116(c) (emphasis added). 
 
The decision to award FECA benefits is entrusted to the 
Secretary of Labor or his or her designee, whose decision is 
"(1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect 
to all questions of law and fact; and (2) not subject to 
review by another official of the United States or by a court 
by mandamus or otherwise." 5 U.S.C. S 8128(b). 
 
The Supreme Court explained Congress's purpose in 
enacting S 8116(c) in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983): 
 
       [FECA] was designed to protect the Government from 
       suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims 
       Act, that had been enacted to waive the Government's 
       sovereign immunity. In enacting this provision, 
       Congress adopted the principal compromise -- the 
       "quid pro quo" -- commonly found in workers' 
       compensation legislation: employees are guaranteed 
       the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, 
       regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but 
       in return they lose the right to sue the Government. 
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Id. at 193-94. 
 
Section 8116(c) thus bars an employee who has collected 
benefits under FECA from subsequently bringing suit 
against his or her employer for damages under the FTCA. 
As this court said in DiPippa v. United States, 687 F.2d 14, 
17 (3d Cir. 1982), "Where FECA applies, it unambiguously 
precludes `all other liability of the United States' either 
`under a workmen's compensation statute or under a 
Federal tort liability statute.' " 
 
Elman relies on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, which in Wright v. United States, 717 F.2d 
254, 259 (6th Cir. 1983), recognized an exception to this 
general rule, widely known as the "dual capacity doctrine." 
The dual capacity doctrine treats the government as though 
it were a third party, and therefore subject to suit despite 
the exclusivity provision of FECA, when the government's 
role in contributing to the employee's injury is entirely 
different from its role in employing that individual. As the 
Sixth Circuit articulated the test, " `An employer may 
become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an 
employee, if--and only if--he possesses a second persona 
so completely independent from and unrelated to his status 
as employer that by established standards the law 
recognizes it as a separate legal person.' " Id. at 259 
(quoting 2A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 14-229, 
S 72.81 (1982)). 
 
Elman urges this court to adopt the dual capacity 
doctrine and to find that the government was acting in one 
persona when it maintained the sidewalk and an entirely 
different one when it employed Elman. We note that some 
of the state courts, interpreting their own state workers' 
compensation statutes, have also adopted versions of the 
dual capacity doctrine. See, e.g., Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ. 
Hosp., 439 A.2d 1162, 1166 (Pa. 1982) (Roberts, J., 
concurring, joined by O'Brien, C.J., and Larsen and 
Flaherty, J.J.); Sobczak v. Flaska, 706 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1998); McGee v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 659 
N.E.2d 317, 323-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Panagos v. North 
Detroit Gen. Hosp., 192 N.W.2d 542, 558-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1971). 
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We have expressed doubts about the wisdom and 
viability of the dual capacity doctrine in the past. In Schmid 
v. United States, 826 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1987), a government 
employee who had been injured while participating in a 
softball game sponsored by his employer alleged that his 
injury was caused by the government's negligent 
maintenance of its property. Schmid sought to recover 
under the FTCA, even though his FECA claim had already 
been approved by the relevant agency. Having been asked 
to adopt the dual capacity doctrine, we expressed 
"concern[ ] that the question at the center of th[at] doctrine 
--whether at the time of injury the employer was acting as 
a third party vis-a-vis the employee--is virtually identical to 
the question the agency must ask in determining whether 
the employee is eligible for FECA benefits--i.e. whether or 
not the injury was sustained `in the performance of his 
duty.' " Id. at 229. We noted that "a court applying the [dual 
capacity] doctrine may come perilously close to second 
guessing the agency's decision about whether the employee 
is entitled to FECA benefits, something that [the statute] 
explicitly states the courts must not do." Id. 
 
We did not, however, reject the dual capacity doctrine in 
that case. Instead, we held that the doctrine would not 
apply to Schmid's claim in any event. We noted that 
Schmid's employer not only owned the land on which 
Schmid was injured, but sponsored the softball game and 
encouraged its employees to participate in such sports 
activities. Although some non-employees were permitted to 
play on the softball teams, we concluded that such 
participation was limited. In these circumstances, we 
viewed the government's role in maintaining the land as 
insufficiently removed from its role as employer to justify 
imposing FTCA liability. 
 
A majority of the courts of appeals that have considered 
similar claims have refused to adopt the dual capacity 
doctrine. See Votteler v. United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130- 
31 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The `dual capacity doctrine' is 
inconsistent with the rationale of our decision in Balancio 
[v. United States, 267 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959)], and we 
reject it."); Bush v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 927 F.2d 445, 
452 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As a result of a short-lived loophole in 
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the [Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act], a 
private shipyard could be subjected to a dual capacity suit. 
The United States, though, by virtue of FECA section 
8116(c) cannot and never could."); Wilder v. United States, 
873 F.2d 285, 289 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that the dual 
capacity doctrine "has been persuasively criticized" and 
"adopt[ing] those criticisms in declining to apply the 
doctrine"); cf. Vilanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (rejecting the dual capacity doctrine in the 
context of a claim under the Nonappropriated Fund 
Instrumentalities Act). 
 
Indeed, Elman has not identified any case in which a 
federal court permitted an individual to sue under the 
FTCA after having received benefits under FECA. The Sixth 
Circuit's decision in Wright is not such a case. There, the 
plaintiff, Sharon Wright, suffered a ruptured tubal 
pregnancy while performing her duties as a secretary at the 
Veterans Administration Hospital. She was treated at the 
hospital, and, according to her allegations, further injured 
by the medical malpractice of the hospital personnel. 
Wright did not file a FECA claim within the three-year 
statute of limitations, but did sue the United States under 
the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected any suggestion that 
Wright's injuries were covered by FECA before it held that 
the dual capacity doctrine would allow Wright to recover 
under both FECA and the FTCA in any event. See 717 F.2d 
at 258-59. Thus, whatever its language, in fact the court 
did not allow Wright to recover under both FECA and the 
FTCA.1 
 
The Sixth Circuit itself has apparently moved away from 
the dual capacity doctrine in subsequent cases. In McCall 
v. United States, 901 F.2d 548, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1990), it 
refused to allow dual recovery where the plaintiff, who was 
injured while on the job in one location, allegedly suffered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660, 663-66 (3d Cir. 1986), we permitted 
a plaintiff to proceed under Title VII after receiving FECA benefits, 
because we concluded that recovery under Title VII did not constitute 
"damages . . . for injury" within the meaning of FECA. We specifically 
noted that the same cannot be said of recovery under the FTCA. See id. 
at 663. 
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further injury when treated for that injury at a government 
hospital in another location. And, as recently as 1997, that 
court stated in a footnote, "The dual-capacity doctrine 
appears merely to represent a rewording of the standard 
inquiry under FECA of whether an employee suffered his 
injuries `while in the performance of his duty.' " Saltsman v. 
United States, 104 F.3d 787, 791 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997). 
Without considering whether this statement is an accurate 
reflection of the court's intent in Wright, the Saltsman 
footnote suggests that the Sixth Circuit may have become 
disenchanted with the dual capacity doctrine. 
 
With this background in mind, we first consider whether 
Elman's claim would fit within the dual capacity doctrine 
before we consider whether to adopt that doctrine as law. 
 
A. 
 
Elman contends that there were two relationships 
between her and the government at the moment of her fall. 
First, she claims, there was an employer-employee 
relationship between her and the EEOC, pursuant to which 
she agreed to perform certain duties in return for payment. 
Second, she claims, there was a landowner-invitee 
relationship between her and the Park Service, in which the 
Park Service extended an invitation to the public to come 
upon particular land and assumed a limited obligation to 
assure the public's safety thereon. Elman acknowledges 
that receipt of FECA benefits prevents her from recovering 
from the government in tort for actions taken in its role as 
her employer. She contends, however, that there is no bar 
to her recovering in tort for actions the government took or 
failed to take as a landowner. 
 
The District Court concluded that the dual capacity 
doctrine would not apply to these facts because "Plaintiff's 
injuries were sustained in the course of activity sufficiently 
related to her employment that the government's role as 
sponsor of the fair and manager of the property was related 
to its role as employer." Elman v. United States, Civ. Action 
No. 97-5825, slip. op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. February 27, 1998). 
 
We disagree. To the extent that the government ever acts 
in more than one capacity, it was doing so here. The Park 
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Service's role in maintaining the Market Street sidewalk is 
not related to the EEOC's role as an employer. Unlike in 
Schmid, the government here did not restrict use of the 
property to EEOC employees in particular, or to federal 
employees more generally. Rather, it held the property open 
to all members of the general public. 
 
Nor was the EEOC's role as sponsor of the benefits fair 
directly responsible for Elman's use of the sidewalk. The 
EEOC allowed its employees to walk to the fair, but there 
is no evidence that it encouraged them to do so or that it 
encouraged them to use the Market Street sidewalk in the 
process. Moreover, the government's motivation in 
maintaining public land, such as the Market Street 
sidewalk, is unrelated to its interests in preventing 
employment discrimination, one of the principal functions 
of the EEOC. Thus, we conclude that the dual capacity 
doctrine would apply to Elman's claims were we to adopt it. 
 
B. 
 
We thus must consider whether that doctrine accurately 
reflects applicable law. 
 
Elman has not identified any language in the FECA 
statute that supports the rule she advocates. Indeed, the 
dual capacity doctrine is inconsistent with the language of 
that statute. Section 8116 provides that FECA liability on 
the part of the United States or an instrumentality thereof 
is "instead of all other liability of the United States or the 
instrumentality to the employee . . . because of the injury 
or death." 5 U.S.C. S 8116(c). In other words, FECA 
recovery bars liability that is (1) "of the United States or the 
instrumentality"; (2) "to the employee"; and (3) "because of 
the injury [compensable under FECA]." Id. The liability 
Elman seeks to impose on the United States with this suit 
meets these three criteria and should be barred under the 
plain language of the statute. Nonetheless, Elman would 
have us carve out an additional exception for liability that 
arises out of the United States' role in a persona other than 
an employer. As a court of limited powers, we see no 
justification for doing so. 
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Elman attempts to offer us a justification by appealing to 
this court's sense of public policy. She correctly notes that 
tort law holds the Park Service responsible for certain 
injuries incurred while the plaintiff was on Park Service 
land in an effort to deter the Park Service from permitting 
dangerous conditions to remain on that land. Elman 
contends that the need for such deterrence is not reduced 
by the fact that the injured party was a federal employee. 
And, she concludes that, therefore, the Park Service's 
liability should not be reduced by that fact. 
 
Although we recognize the force of some of Elman's 
observations, we decline to adopt her conclusion because it 
ignores the fact that workers' compensation laws represent 
a balance. The injured workers have assurance they will be 
compensated quickly, efficiently, and without extended 
litigation in return for limited recovery exclusive to that 
claim. The reduction in liability is based solely on the 
injured party's status as an employee, not on any lessening 
of the need for deterrence. FECA likewise sacrifices some 
deterrence in order to assure that federal employees 
"receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and 
without need for litigation." Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 460 
U.S. at 194. Thus, were we to adopt the dual capacity 
doctrine Elman advocates, we would undermine the 
workers' compensation rationale embodied in FECA. That is 
a decision that must be made by Congress. 
 
As the Second Circuit stated in Votteler, "Sometimes the 
broad coverage of a compensation scheme confers a 
`benefit' that a plaintiff would rather forgo in preference to 
the traditional tort remedies, but the breadth of coverage, 
with its consequent exclusivity, must be upheld, even when 
it might not be advantageous to the employee." 904 F.2d at 
130. This logic is particularly applicable here where the 
employee, having already accepted the benefit of the 
workers' compensation scheme, now seeks a fuller recovery 
under tort law. 
 
Finally, we address Elman's remaining argument, viz., 
that our construction of the relevant federal statutes should 
be informed by principles of state law, in this case 
Pennsylvania law. Elman notes (1) that the federal 
government is subject to suit under the FTCA "in the same 
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manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. S 2674, and (2) that 
the extent to which a private employer would be subject to 
suit under similar circumstances would depend on 
Pennsylvania's willingness to accept the dual capacity 
doctrine. She concludes that this court should therefore 
look to that doctrine as it exists under Pennsylvania law to 
determine the extent of the government's liability. 
 
We disagree. It is FECA, specifically S 8116(c), not the 
FTCA which bars Elman from bringing suit. Even if Elman 
is right that the extent of government liability under the 
FTCA should be determined by reference to Pennsylvania 
law and that such FTCA liability would exist here, FECA 
excuses the government from that FTCA liability in any 
event. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court granting Appellees summary judgment on 
Elman's FTCA claims. 
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